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Abstract
The established view on massive IoT access is that the IoT devices are activated randomly and independently. This is a
basic premise also in the recent information-theoretic treatment of massive access by Polyanskiy [1]. In a number of practical
scenarios, the information from IoT devices in a given geographical area is inherently correlated due to a commonly observed
physical phenomenon. We introduce a model for massive access that accounts for correlation both in device activation and in
the message content. To this end, we introduce common alarm messages for all devices. A physical phenomenon can trigger an
alarm causing a subset of devices to transmit the same message at the same time. We develop a new error probability model that
includes false positive errors, resulting from decoding a non-transmitted codeword. The results show that the correlation allows
for high reliability at the expense of spectral efficiency. This reflects the intuitive trade-off: an access from a massive number can
be ultra-reliable only if the information across the devices is correlated.
I. INTRODUCTION
The interconnection of billions of devices within the Internet of Things (IoT) paradigm is one of the main challenges
for future networks. Accordingly, the service structure of 5G, fully aligned with the ITU-R vision for IMT-2020, includes
the massive Machine Type-Communication (mMTC) as one of the three core connectivity types. mMTC is typically defined
through a scenario in which a massive number of IoT devices are connected to a Base Station (BS). The activation of the
IoT devices is intermittent, such that at a given time, the IoT devices that are active and have a message to send constitute
a random subset from the total set of devices [2]. A main use case for IoT is a distributed sensor network that intelligently
monitors and manages a large number of devices [3]. The traffic in such systems can be (quasi-)periodic or event-driven [4].
In addition, source information and time correlations occur when many devices are sensing a common physical phenomenon.
The conventional multiple access channel (MAC) has been well characterized [5]–[7]. The main results here are derived using
the fact that the probability of successful joint decoding goes asymptotically to one with increasing blocklength. However, in the
context of mMTC the devices have small data payloads. Even though a small subset of the devices are active simultaneously,
the large total number of devices (up to 300 000 in a single cell [8]) means that the number of active devices can still be
comparable to the blocklength. This results in finite blocklength (FBL) effects. A number of works have addressed the problem
of massive access [8], [9]. However, in terms of theoretical rigor and fundamental results two works stand out, both of them
assuming independent traffic. The first one is on the many-access channel by X. Chen et al. [10]. This paper shows the scaling
of the number of users with the blocklength. On the other hand, Y. Polyanskiy provides a model in [1] that is closer to the
way massive access is commonly understood. Key elements of the model are devices employing the same codebook which
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Fig. 1. System model with common alarm and standard messages. pd denotes the probability of detecting an alarm, and ps is the probability of sending a
standard message.
precludes the identification of users and the error measure is done on a per-device basis. This has also been called unsourced
random access [11].
In this we build upon the model in [1] with an important extension: we bring in the correlation of activation and message
content across different devices. This is different from the mainstream view on massive random access, where the device
activation and message content is independent across the devices. An exemplary case is as follows: IoT devices can send
standard messages or alarm messages, the latter with critical reliability requirement and triggered by a commonly observed
phenomenon. In normal operation, standard uncorrelated messages are sent. Upon the alarm activation, a number of IoT
devices will prioritize it and send the same message. This reflects the extreme all-or-nothing correlation where devices are
either mutually independent, or they are completely correlated both in source information and in time. Our model intends to
capture the following intuitive observation. If the number of devices that transmit the same alarm message increases, then the
reliability of the alarm message increases at the expense of the decrease of the total amount of information that comes from the
total population of connected IoT devices. The model can be seen as having an (alarm) event that needs to be communicated
through a random subset of devices, see Fig. 1. By removing the alarm event the model boils down to the model in [1].
Differently from previous works, the per-device probability of error is not meaningful for devices transmitting the alarm
event in our model. Instead, the common alarm itself can be seen as a “ghost” device, which communicates through the actual
IoT devices (see Fig. 1) and we calculate the error probability with respect to this ghost device. In addition, the fact that
we consider two message types (standard and alarm messages) necessitates the introduction of false positive errors, namely
decoding a codeword that was not transmitted. In the system model in Fig. 1, decoding an alarm message when no alarm has
occurred is critical. This type of error is, typically, not considered in a common communication-theoretic setting, where an
error is defined as the event in which a decoder is not decoding a codeword correctly.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the system model including the source information and
time correlations. In Section III the entropy and the spectral efficiency of the correlated devices is derived. Section IV defines
the alarm random access code based on the novel error model, and the error bound is derived in Section V. Finally, numerical
evaluations are presented in Section VI, and concluding remarks are given in Section VII. Table I lists the notation used in
this paper.
II. CORRELATION MODEL
We consider the uplink in a random access channel in which each access opportunity is a block of n channel uses. In
each block, K out of N devices transmit a message from one of the two disjoint message sets Ms and Ma, consisting of
Ms = |Ms| standard messages and Ma = |Ma| alarm messages, respectively. A typical case is having a stringent reliability
3Notation
A: Alarm event a: Target probability of error for alarm messages
N : Total number of devices sa: Target probability of error for standard messages in alarm event
K: Number of active devices fp: Target probability of false positive
Ka: Number of devices sending an alarm message S: Spectral efficiency
pa: Alarm probability H: Entropy
ps: Standard message probability Wj Message transmitted by the j-th device
pd: Alarm detection probability a
j
i (lower case): (ai, . . . , aj), i ≤ j for scalars/vectors
Ms: Set of standard messages Xji (upper case): (Xi, . . . , Xj), i ≤ j for random variables/vectors
Ma: Set of alarm messages ai−1i : Empty tuple
n: Blocklength
∑j−1
i=j aj : 0
P ′: Average transmission power [S]k Set of all k-subsets of the set S
P : Maximal transmission power X : ∈ Rn Input alphabet
s: Target probability of error for standard messages without an alarm Y: ∈ Rn Output alphabet
TABLE I
NOTATION USED THROUGHOUT THIS PAPER.
requirement for the alarm messages, and a high throughput and massive access requirement for the rest. As also done in [1],
we assume that the number of active devices, K, is known by the receiver.
Let PY |XK1 : [Xn]K → Yn be a memoryless multiple access channel (MAC) satisfying permutation invariance where X ,Y
are the input and output alphabets. That is, the distribution PY |XK1 (·|xK1 ) coincides with PY |XK1 (·|xpi(1), . . . ,xpi(K)) for any
xK1 ∈ [Xn]K and any permutation pi. This assumption relates to the fact that no user identification is done at the receiver, i.e.
unsourced random access [11]. Therefore, all devices use the same encoder f : Ms ∪Ma → Xn and the receiver decodes
according to the possibly randomized map g : Yn → [Ms ∪Ma]K−Ka+1, where Ka is the random number of devices that
send alarm messages and [S]k denotes the set of all k-subsets of the set S.
We denote the message transmitted by the j-th device as Wj . The transmitted messages are chosen according to the following
model: An alarm event, A, occurs with probability pa, and there is no alarm with probability 1− pa. If no alarm occurs then
the system acts as in [1], i.e. each device transmits a message uniformly chosen from Ms with probability ps, and it is silent
with probability 1−ps. If an alarm occurs, with probability pd a device will detect it and transmit an alarm message. Contrary
to the standard messages, all devices detecting the alarm send the same message chosen uniformly fromMa. With probability
1− pd the device will act as if no alarm has occurred. It follows that P[Wj ∈Ma] = papd and P[Wj ∈Ms] = ps − papspd.
Notice that the probability pd in our model is the joint event of detecting an alarm and deciding to transmit a corresponding
alarm message. The latter can be seen as a system design parameter and its impact to the system performance, particularly in
the tradeoff between reliability and spectral efficiency, is discussed in next section.
In contrast to practical random access scenarios, we assume that the number of active devices, K, is known by the receiver.
This assumption can be justified by noting that K could be estimated using the same procedure as in [12]. Specifically, the
base station can decode the received packets under the assumption that K = 0, 1, . . . , N , and then re-generate the resulting
packets and subtract them from the received signal. K can then be determined based on the residual, which will equal the noise
Z, see (12) if the correct value of K has been determined. Furthermore, since the number of alarm messages, Ka, is assumed
unknown in the model, an incorrectly estimated K will mainly affect the decoding of the non-critical standard messages.
4III. SPECTRAL EFFICIENCY
In this section, we study how the presence of common alarm messages affects the information transmitted in the system.
We consider the system spectral efficiency defined as S = H(W
K
1 )
n , where K is the number of devices transmitting messages
W1, ...WK , H is the joint entropy function and n is the blocklength.
The total number of devices, N , in the network affects the system spectral efficiency. To see this, consider the case with a
high alarm detection probability pd, a low ps, alarm probability pa = 0.5, and suppose we receive 10 messages, i.e. K = 10.
If also N = 10, then there is a high probability that an alarm has occurred since we know that all devices transmitted and
that pd is high. Moreover, in this case all devices have most likely transmitted the same message, resulting in a low spectral
efficiency. On the other hand, with N = 10000 devices in the network the probability that an alarm has occurred is low, being
unlikely that 9990 devices do not detect an alarm when pd is high. In this case, the messages are likely to be distinct, resulting
in a high spectral efficiency.
The exact expression for the system spectral efficiency for this model is stated in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. For K out of N received messages and correlated devices as describe in Section II the system spectral efficiency,
S, is
S =
1
n
K∑
k=1
H(Wk|W k−11 ), (1)
where H(Wk|W k−11 ) is given by
H(Wk|W k−11 ) = (B0 +B1)
k−1∑
i=1
(
k − 1
i
)
pap
i
d((1− pd)ps)k−1−iN0
−B2
(
B3 log2
B3
Ma
+ (1−B3) log2
1−B3
Ms
)
,
(2)
and
N0 =
(pd + (1− pd)ps)K−(k−1)(1− pd)N−K
pa(pd + (1− pd)ps)K(1− pd)N−K + (1− pa)pKs
, (3)
B0 = − pd
pd + (1− pd)ps log2
(
pd
pd + (1− pd)ps
)
, (4)
B1 =
(1− pd)ps
pd + (1− pd)ps
(
log2Ms − log2
(
(1− pd)ps
pd + (1− pd)ps
))
, (5)
B2 =
pa(1− pd)N−K+(k−1)pk−1s (pd + (1− pd)ps)K−(k−1) + (1− pa)pKs
pa(pd + (1− pd)ps)K(1− pd)N−K + (1− pa)pKs
, (6)
B3 =
papd(pd + (1− pd)ps)K−k(1− pd)N−K+k−1pk−1s
pa(pd + (1− pd)ps)K−k+1(1− pd)N−K+k−1pk−1s + (1− pa)pKs
. (7)
Proof of Theorem 1 can be found in Appendix A.
For pa = 0 or pd = 0 (i.e. no correlation) the system spectral efficiency is the well-known Kn log2Ms as in [1].
IV. ALARM RANDOM ACCESS CODES
We now define a random access code that allows for reliability diversity for standard and alarm messages. This entails
having different error events for the two message types. Specifically, in order to capture the characteristics of alarm messages,
we introduce reliability constraints that relates to the certainty of decoding alarm messages in the event of an alarm, but also
to the certainty of not decoding alarm messages when no alarms has occurred (false positives). This is different from usual
analysis since we need not only consider the event of incorrectly decoding a message, but also the type of message that is
decoded instead.
5Classification of events
Error No error
No alarm - A standard message is not decoded: - A standard message is decoded:
{Ms 3Wj /∈ g(Y )} {Ms 3Wj ∈ g(Y )}
- More than one device sends the same message: - Different messages are sent:
{Wj =Wi for some i 6= j} {Wj 6=Wi ∀ i 6= j}
- At least one alarm message is decoded: - No alarm message is decoded:
{g(Y ) ∩Ma 6= ∅} (false positive) {g(Y ) ∩Ma = ∅} (true negative)
Alarm - The alarm message is not decoded: - The alarm message is decoded:
{W0 /∈ g(Y )} (false negative) {W0 ∈ g(Y )} (true positive)
- More than one alarm message is decoded: - More than one device sends the same alarm message:
{|g(Y ) ∩Ma| > 1} {Wj =Wi =W0 ∈Ma for some i 6= j}
- A standard message is not decoded:
{Ms 3Wj /∈ g(Y )}
- Two or more device sends the same standard
message:
{Wi =Wj ∈Ms for some i 6= j}
TABLE II
ERROR EVENTS IN THE CONSIDERED SYSTEM. IN THE ALARM EVENT WE DENOTE THE ALARM MESSAGE BY W0 .
The error events are listed in Table II, where we have included the “No error” column to emphasize the opposite characteristics
of alarm messages and standard messages. We define error events for standard messages as in [1], i.e. errors are considered
per-device and the event that more than one device sends the same standard message results in an error. In contrast, no error
occurs if multiple devices transmit the same alarm message. Similarly, decoding distinct alarm messages also results in an
error since only one alarm is assumed to be active at a time, while decoding distinct standard messages is naturally not an
error. Formally, we define the following error events: Ej , {Wj /∈ g(Y )} ∪ {Wj = Wi for some i 6= j} is the event of not
decoding the message from the j-th device, Ea , {W0 /∈ g(Y )} ∪ {|g(Y ) ∩Ma| > 1} for W0 ∈ Ma is the event of not
decoding an alarm message or decoding more than one, and Efp , {g(Y ) ∩Ma 6= ∅} is the event of decoding any alarm
message (which is an error when no alarm has occurred). This leads to the following definition of a K-user alarm random
access (ARA) code.
Definition 2. An (Ms,Ma, n, a, s, sa, fp) alarm random access (ARA) code for the K-user channel PY |XK1 is a pair of
(possibly randomized) maps, the encoder f :Ms ∪Ma → Xn, and the decoder g : Yn → [Ms ∪Ma]K−Ka+1 satisfying
P [Ea|A] ≤ a, (8)
1
K
K∑
j=1
P [Ej |¬A] ≤ s, (9)
EKa
 1
K −Ka
K−Ka∑
j=1
P [Ej |A]
 ≤ sa, (10)
P [Efp|¬A] ≤ fp, (11)
where Xj = f(Wj), W1, . . . ,WK ∈ Ms when there is no alarm and W1, . . . ,WK−Ka ∈ Ms, WK−Ka+1 = . . . = WK =
W0 ∈Ma in the alarm event for a random number, Ka, alarm messages.
The left hand side of (8) is the probability of not decoding or resolving the alarm message in the alarm event. The left hand
side of (9) is the average per-device error probability when there is no alarm, and (10) refers to the case when there is an
6alarm. Lastly left hand side of (11) is the probability of false positives. In a practical scenario the entities a, s, sa and fp
can be treated as reliability requirements, in which case the achievability of an ARA code is of interest.
In the remainder of the paper we limit the analysis to the Gaussian MAC (GMAC) given by
Y =
K∑
m=1
Xm +Z. (12)
where Z ∈ Rn is a standard Gaussian noise vector. Additionally a maximal average transmission power, P , is included. That
is we require ‖f(Wj)‖22 ≤ nP . This model is based on the assumption that the blocklength is short enough to be within the
coherence time of the channel. This allows for the devices to do channel inversion and precode their signals so that they add
up coherently at the receiver. This gives the possibility of a very high reliability for alarm messages.
V. RANDOM CODING ERROR BOUND
The achievability conditions for an ARA code are presented in Theorem 3, which provides bounds for the error probabilities
a, s, sa and fp for a given blocklenght n, message set sizes Ma and Ms, average transmission power P ′, and maximal
transmission power P .
Theorem 3. Fix P ′ < P . There exists an (Ma,Ms, n, a, s, sa, fp) alarm random access code for the K-user GMAC
satisfying power-constraint P and
a ≤
K∑
Ka=0
pKa(Ka)a(K,Ka) + p0, (13)
s ≤ b(K) + c(K)− b(K)c(K), (14)
sa ≤
K∑
Ka=0
pKa(Ka) (1− d (K,Ka) (1− c (K −Ka))) (15)
fp ≤ b(K). (16)
Defining φ(k, α) = 12 ln(1 + 2kP
′α) and Φ(k, α) = α1+2kP ′α , then related to (13):
pKa(k) =
(
K
k
)
pkd ((1− pd) ps)K−k
(pd + (1− pd)ps)K , (17)
a(K,Ka) = min
 K∑
K′a=0
e−nEa , 1
 , (18)
p0 = P
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
Z2i >
P
P ′
]
, (19)
Ea = max
0≤ρ≤1,0<λa
− ρ
n
ln(Ma − 1) + ξa, (20)
ξa = ρφ(K
′2
a , λa) + φ(K
2
a , ρβa) + φ(K −Ka, γa) + φ(1/P ′, ψa), (21)
ψa = Φ(K −Ka, γa), γa = Φ(K2a , ρβa)− ρλa, βa = Φ(K ′2a , λa). (22)
Related to (16):
b(K) = min
 K∑
K′a=1
e−nEfp , 1
 , (23)
Efp = max
0≤ρ≤1, 0<λfp
− ρ
n
ln(Ma) + ξfp, (24)
7ξfp = ρφ(K
′2
a , λfp) + φ(K, ρβfp) + φ(1/P
′, γfp), (25)
γfp = Φ(K, ρβfp), βfp = Φ(K
′2
a , λfp)− λfp, (26)
Related to (14)
c(K) =
K∑
t=1
t
K
min(pt, qt) +
(
K
2
)
Ms
+Kp0, (27)
pt = e
−nEt , (28)
Et = max
0≤ρ,ρ1≤1
−ρρ1tR1 − ρ1R2 + E0(ρ, ρ1), (29)
E0(ρ, ρ1) = ρρ1φ(t, λs) + ρ1φ(t, µ) +
1
2
ln(1− 2bρ1), (30)
b = ρλs − Φ(t, µ), µ = ρΦ(t, λs), λs = P
′t− 1 +√D
4(1 + ρ1ρ)P ′t
, (31)
D = (P ′t− 1)2 + 4P ′t1 + ρρ1
1 + ρ
, (32)
R1 =
1
n
ln(Ms)− 1
nt
ln(t!), R2 =
1
n
ln
(
K
t
)
, (33)
qt = inf
γs
P [It ≤ γs] + en(tR1+R2)−γs , (34)
It = min
S0∈[Ms]t
it
 ∑
W∈S0
cW ;Y |
∑
W∈Sc0
cW )
 , (35)
it(a;y|b) = nCt + ln e
2
(
‖y − b‖22
1 + P ′t
− ‖y − a− b‖22
)
, (36)
where Ct = φ(1/2, t), S0 ∈ [Ms]t is a t-subset of true standard messages and cW ∼ N (0, InP ′) is codeword corresponding
to message W . Related to (15):
d(K,Ka) = (1− (a(K,Ka) + p0))(1− e(K,Ka) + p0), (37)
e(K,Ka) = min

K∑
K′a=0
K′a 6=Ka
e−nEsa , 1
 , (38)
Esa = max
0<λsa
φ((Ka −K ′a)2, λsa) + φ(K −Ka, βsa) + φ(1/P ′, γsa), (39)
γsa = Φ (K −Ka, βsa) , βsa = Φ
(
(Ka −K ′a)2, λsa
)− λsa. (40)
Proof of Theorem 3 can be found in Appendix B.
VI. NUMERICAL EVALUATION
The bounds in Theorem 3 are given for a fixed number of active devices, K, but the probability of a given value of K
depends on whether an alarm has happened or not. Therefore, we consider the average bound over the distribution of K
conditioned on the alarm state and the total number of devices, N . The distribution of K given an alarm is
pK(k|A) =
(
N
k
)
(pd + (1− pd)ps)k(1− pd)N−k(1− ps)N−k, (41)
and the distribution of K given no alarm is
pK(k|¬A) =
(
N
k
)
pks (1− ps)N−k. (42)
8Fig. 2. Trade-off between probability of error for alarm messages and the spectral efficiency. Blocklength n = 30 000, N = 1000, target error probabilities
s = 10−1, fp = 10−5, set sizes Ms = 2100, Ma = 23, ps = 0.01 and pa = 1.
We first study the trade-off between the probability of error for alarm messages and the per-device spectral efficiency S,
during the event of an alarm. We consider a setting with N = 1000 devices and a blocklength of n = 30 000. The alarm and
standard messages are 3 and 100 bits, respectively. The probability of activation when there is no alarm is ps = 0.01, and the
transmission power is chosen such that the target average error bound for standard messages is s = 10−1, and the probability
of false positive alarms is below fp = 10−5. Having only a few bits for alarm messages is a realistic setting, e.g. in a sensor
network the alarm could be that a sensed value is too high or too low resulting in only one bit needed for the alarm message.
In Fig. 2 it can be seen that the probability of error increases for increasing spectral efficiency (decreasing pd). Notice
that the maximum spectral efficiency is achieved when the error probability is one (or equivalently, pd = 0), i.e. no alarm
messages are detected. This is expected since a higher number of devices transmitting alarm messages reduces the per-device
spectral efficiency, but increases the received signal-to-noise ratio of alarm messages. Furthermore, very high reliability is
achievable. This trade-off between spectral efficiency and probability of error is not surprising since this is also the case when
the blocklength or message set size are changed. The novelty is in the fact that it is the correlation between devices that causes
the trade-off.
We now consider the minimal average transmission power, P ′, required to satisfy some target error probabilities. We assume
no power restriction. That is p0 = 0 in Theorem 3. Let all parameters be fixed except P ′ and pd. This is an optimization
problem on the form
minimize
0≤P ′, 0≤pd≤1
P ′
s.t.
∑N
K=0 pK(K|¬A)(b(K) + c(K)− b(K)c(K)) ≤ s∑N
K=0 pK(K|¬A)b(K) ≤ fp∑N
K=0 pK(K|A)
∑K
Ka=0
pKa(Ka)a(K,Ka) ≤ a∑N
K=0 pK(K|A)
∑K
Ka=0
pKa(Ka)(1− d(K,Ka)(1− c(K −Ka))) ≤ sa
(43)
The constraint functions are strictly increasing for decreasing values of P ′ and pd, and the first two constraints do not depend on
9pd. Therefore, the problem can be efficiently solved using bisection by first minimizing P ′ subject to the first two constraints,
and then determine pd from the last two constraints using the P ′ from the previous step. This provides a feasible solution for
the values of N, a and sa of interest in this paper. However, if no feasible pd ∈ [0, 1] can be obtained from the second step,
then a solution can be found by setting pd = 1 and minimizing P ′ subject to the last two constraints.
We use the same system parameters as in the previous scenario, except that we now fix a = fp = 10−5 and s = sa = 10−1.
Based on the optimal pd and the values of ps, pa, we evaluate the minimal average energy-per-bit EpK
[
E0
N0
]
= nP
′
2EpK [H(WK1 )/K]
.
In Fig. 3 the solid blue line shows the energy-per-bit as a function of total number devices, N , for this setup. Notice that
optimization is done for each N . Additionally, the achievable energy-per-bit for the uncorrelated case (pd = 0) is included
for reference, and is obtained as described in [1] but without the transmission power restriction. It can be seen that almost
the same energy-per-bit is achievable for correlated and uncorrelated devices up to approximately 13000 devices, where the
energy-per-bit required in the correlated case starts to increase significantly. This is due to the fact that the bound for false
positives starts to dominate the choice of P ′. Thus, due to high multi-access interference, the probability of decoding a false
positive is higher than the probability of failing to decode a standard message. The increase in power needed to accommodate
the false positive target probability fp causes the error probability of standard messages to go well below their target error
probability s. In fact, with more than 17500 devices the error bound for standard messages is also approximately 10−5. This
is similar to the behavior in the uncorrelated case where the finite blocklength penalty is the dominating constraint when N
is small, while multi-access interference dominates for large N [1]. This is seen in the increase in the slope at around 15000
devices in the uncorrelated case.
The effect of increasing alarm probability, pa, can be seen as the dashed curves in Fig. 3. The energy-per-bit is higher
for larger pa due to the increased rate of alarm events where spectral efficiency is lower. The energy-per-bit in alarm events
corresponds to the curve for pa = 1. Notice that the energy requirement P ′ and the probability pd are not altered by varying
pa since the error probabilities for ARA codes are conditioned on the occurrence of an alarm. The high energy-per-bit for
small N and high pa is due to the large number of devices (relative to N ) that must devote their resources to a single alarm
message in order to accommodate the target alarm reliability. In general, the curves corresponding to different values of pa
are approaching each other for increasing N . This is caused by the almost constant number of alarm messages required to
achieve the alarm target reliability. For increasing N this ratio of alarm messages to standard messages grows and the traffic
will be mostly standard messages.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have studied the trade-off between reliability and spectral efficiency in a massive random access scenario where the
devices can send standard messages or alarm messages. The alarm messages are triggered by a common physical phenomenon
and introduce correlation in both the transmitted messages and the activation of devices. We derive the system spectral
efficiency and propose an achievability bound for alarm random access codes. We show that very reliable transmissions of
alarm messages can be achieved, but that the correlation causes a trade-off in spectral efficiency. In particular, when the
multi-access interference is moderate, the cost of providing high reliability of alarm messages is small in terms of the average
energy-per-bit. However, when multi-access interference is high, the probability of decoding a false positive alarm message
dominates the error probabilities, and the cost of providing high reliability is significant.
10
Fig. 3. Trade-off between Eb
N0
and the number of devices, N , for different values of alarm probability pa and for uncorrelated devices. Blocklength n = 30 000,
target error probabilities a = fp = 10−5, s = sa = 10−1, set sizes Ms = 2100, Ma = 23 and ps = 0.01.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
To explicitly show the dependency on the number of messages define
TNK = {W1 ∈Ma ∪Ms} ∪ · · · ∪ {WK ∈Ma ∪Ms} ∪ {WK+1 ∈ ∅} ∪ · · · ∪ {WN ∈ ∅} (44)
as the event that the first K out of N devices transmit and the rest are silent. Due to symmetry in the devices, and without
loss of generality, we assume the K first devices that are transmitting. By the law of total probability this event has probability
p(TNK ) = pa(pd + (1− pd)ps)K(1− pd)N−K(1− ps)N−K + (1− pa)pKs (1− ps)N−K , (45)
System spectral efficiency, S, is defined as S = H(WK1 )/n where the joint entropy of all K messages can be expressed
using the chain rule for entropy [13, Theo. 2.5.1] as
H(WK1 ) =
K∑
k=1
H(Wk|W k−11 ). (46)
Thus we need to express the conditional entropy H(Wk|W k−11 ) given by
H(Wk|W k−11 ) =
∑
w1∈Ma∪Ms
· · ·
∑
wk−1∈Ma∪Ms
p(wk−11 |TNK )H(Wk|W k−11 = wk−11 ), (47)
where
H(Wk|W k−11 = wk−11 ) = −
∑
wk∈Ma∪Ms
p(wk|wk−11 , TNK ) log2(p(wk|wk−11 , TNK )), (48)
for k ≤ K.
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Observe that Ms and Ma are disjoint so that we can split each sum in (47) into two sums over wi ∈ Ma and wi ∈ Ms.
For convenience, we define the set Ak = {wk1 | wk1 ∈ [Ma ∪Ms]k,∃ 0 ≤ i ≤ k : wi ∈ Ma} as the set of k-subsets of
Ma ∪Ms that contain at least one alarm message and rewrite (47) as
H(Wk|W k−11 ) =
∑
wk−11 ∈Ak−1
pA(w
k−1
1 |TNK )HA(Wk|W k−11 = wk−11 ) +
∑
wk−11 ∈[Ms]k−1
pS(w
k−1
1 |TNK )HS(Wk|W k−11 = wk−11 ).
(49)
We first derive an expression for HA(Wk|W k−11 = wk−11 ) using the fact that at least one of w1, . . . , wk−1 belongs to Ma.
We additionally split the sum in (48) into two sums; one over wk ∈Ma and one over wk ∈Ms:
HA(Wk|W k−11 = wk−11 ) = −
∑
wk∈Ma
p(wk|wk−11 ∈ Ak−1, TNK ) log2(p(wk|wk−11 ∈ Ak−1, TNK ))
−
∑
wk∈Ms
p(wk|wk−11 ∈ Ak−1, TNK ) log2(p(wk|wk−11 ∈ Ak−1, TNK )).
(50)
Using Bayes’ theorem we obtain
p(Wk ∈Ma|wk−11 ∈ Ak−1, TNK ) =
p(TNK |Wk ∈Ma, wk−11 ∈ Ak−1)p(Wk ∈Ma|wk−11 ∈ Ak−1)
p(TNK |wk−11 ∈ Ak−1)
=
(pd + (1− pd)ps)K−k(1− pd)N−k(1− ps)N−kpd
(pd + (1− pd)ps)K−(k−1)(1− ps)N−k(1− ps)N−k
=
pd
pd + (1− pd)ps . (51)
Since all devices that detect the alarm transmit the same message, the first term in (50) is
−
∑
wk∈Ma
p(wk|wk−11 ∈ Ak−1, TNK ) log2(p(wk|wk−11 ∈ Ak−1, TNK )) = −
pd
pd + (1− pd)ps log2
(
pd
pd + (1− pd)ps
)
, B0. (52)
Similarly, for the summation over wk ∈Ms in (50) we obtain
p(Wk ∈Ms|wk−11 ∈ Ak−1, TNK ) =
(1− pd)ps
pd + (1− pd)ps = 1− p(Wk ∈Ma|w
k−1
1 ∈ Ak−1, TNK ). (53)
Since the standard messages are not mutually exclusive, and equally likely, it follows that the second term in (50) becomes
−
∑
wk∈Ms
p(wk|wk−11 , TNK ) log2(p(wk|wk−11 , TNK )) = −
∑
wk∈Ms
1
Ms
(1− pd)ps
pd + (1− pd)ps log2
(
1
Ms
(1− pd)ps
pd + (1− pd)ps
)
=
(1− pd)ps
pd + (1− pd)ps
(
log2Ms − log2
(
(1− pd)ps
pd + (1− pd)ps
))
, B1,
(54)
Substituting (52) and (54) into (50) yields HA(Wk|W k−11 = wk−11 ) = B0 +B1.
We now derive an expression for pA(wk−11 |TNK ) in (49). Let 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 denote the (random) number of alarm
messages in wk−11 and, without loss of generality, assume that the alarm messages occupy the first i positions of W
k−1
1 , i.e.
w1, . . . , wi ∈ [Ma]i and wi+1, . . . , wk−1 ∈ [Ms]k−i+1. For a fixed i, the probability pA(wk−11 |TNK ) is obtained using Bayes’
theorem as
pA(W
i
1 = w
i
1 ∈ [Ma]i,W k−1i+1 = wk−1i+1 ∈ [Ms]k−(i+1)|TNK )
=
1
MaM
k−(i+1)
s
(pd + (1− pd)ps)K−(k−1)(1− pd)N−Kpapid(1− pd)k−(i+1)pk−(i+1)s
pa(pd + (1− pd)ps)K(1− pd)N−K + (1− pa)pKs
=
pap
i
d((1− pd)ps)k−1−i
MaM
k−1−i
s
N0 (55)
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where N0 is given as in (3). Notice that as before only one alarm message is used at a given time so Ma is not raised to
the power of i. Since there are exactly
(
k−1
i
)
MaM
k−1−i
s equiprobable and disjoint message sets w
k−1
1 consisting of i alarm
messages and k − 1− i standard messages, the first term of (49) can be expressed as∑
wk−11 ∈Ak−1
pA(w
k−1
1 |TNK )HA(Wk|W k−11 = wk−11 ) =
k−1∑
i=1
(
k − 1
i
) ∑
wi1∈[Ma]i
wk−1i+1 ∈[Ms]k−1−i
pap
i
d((1− pd)ps)k−1−i
MaM
k−1−i
s
N0(B0 +B1)
(56)
= (B0 +B1)
k−1∑
i=1
(
k − 1
i
)
pap
i
d((1− pd)ps)k−1−iN0. (57)
We now consider the second term in (49). Here the conditional messages in HS and messages in pS are all standard messages.
In contrast to the previous case, this can happen both when there is no alarm, and when there is alarm but none of the devices
detect it. As before, we rewrite (48) as
HS(Wk|W k−11 = wk−11 ) = −
∑
wk∈Ma
p(wk|wk−11 ∈ [Ms]k−1, TNK ) log2(p(wk|wk−11 ∈ [Ms]k−1, TNK ))
−
∑
wk∈Ms
p(wk|wk−11 ∈ [Ms]k−1, TNK ) log2(p(wk|wk−11 ∈ [Ms]k−1, TNK )).
(58)
Since each alarm message is equally likely, applying Bayes’ theorem and the law of total probability repeatedly yields
p(wk ∈Ma|wk−11 ∈ [Ms]k−1, TNK ) =
1
Ma
papd(pd + (1− pd)ps)K−k(1− pd)N−K+k−1pk−1s
pa(pd + (1− pd)ps)K−k+1(1− pd)N−K+k−1pk−1s + (1− pa)pKs
(59)
, 1
Ma
B3. (60)
Similarly, for p(wk ∈Ms|wk−11 ∈ [Ms]k−1, TNK ) we obtain
p(wk ∈Ms|wk−11 ∈ [Ms]k−1, TNK ) =
1
Ms
(1−B3). (61)
Therefore we get
HS(Wk|W k−11 = wk−11 ) = −
∑
wk∈Ma
B3
Ma
log2
B3
Ma
−
∑
wk∈Ms
1−B3
Ms
log2
1−B3
Ms
(62)
= −B3 log2
B3
Ma
− (1−B3) log2
1−B3
Ms
. (63)
Finally, pS(wk−11 |TNK ) is given by
p(wk−11 ∈ [Ms]k−1|TNK ) =
1
Mk−1s
pa(1− pd)N−K+(k−1)pk−1s (pd + (1− pd)ps)K−(k−1) + (1− pa)pKs
pa(pd + (1− pd)ps)K(1− pd)N−K + (1− pa)pKs
, 1
Mk−1s
B2.
(64)
Using (63) and (64), the last term in (49) can be expressed as∑
wk−11 ∈[Ms]k−1
pS(w
k−1
1 |TNK )HS(Wk|W k−11 = wk−11 ) =
∑
wk−11 ∈[Ms]k−1
B2
Mk−1s
(
−B3 log2
B3
Ma
− (1−B3) log2
1−B3
Ms
)
(65)
= −B2
(
B3 log2
B3
Ma
+ (1−B3) log2
1−B3
Ms
)
(66)
Inserting (57) and (66) into (47) yields the final expression:
H(Wk|W k−11 ) = (B0 +B1)
k−1∑
i=1
(
k − 1
i
)
pap
i
d((1− pd)ps)k−1−iN0 −B2
(
B3 log2
B3
Ma
+ (1−B3) log2
1−B3
Ms
)
(67)

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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Generate the Ma + Ms = M codewords c1, . . . , cM
i.i.d.∼ N (0, P ′In). We assume that the first Ma codewords are alarm
messages and the last Ms codewords are standards messages. Recall that Wj is the codeword selected by the j-th device. If
‖cWj‖22 > nP then device j transmits 0 instead, i.e. Xj = 0, otherwise Xj = cWj , 1 ≤ j ≤ K. Decoding is done in two steps.
The transmitted alarm message (if any) is decoded first and canceled from the received signal, and then the decoder proceeds
to decoding the standard messages. Notice that the order of decoding reflects the fact that alarm messages are expected to
have a higher reliability requirement than standard messages.
In the first step, the decoder estimates the transmitted alarm message Ŵ and the number of devices transmitting the alarm
message K̂a:
Ŵ , K̂a = arg min
W∈Ma
0≤Ka≤K
‖KacW − Y ‖22. (68)
If K̂a ≥ 1 the decoder outputs Ŵ as the alarm message and zero otherwise. The estimated interference from the alarm messages
is subtracted from the received signal in a successive interference cancellation fashion as YSIC = Y −K̂acŴ . Next the decoder
outputs the set of standard messages Sˆ ∈ [Ms]K−Kˆa
Sˆ = arg min
S∈[Ms]K−Kˆa
∥∥∥∥∥∑
W∈S
cW − YSIC
∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
. (69)
We consider Gallager type bounds [14]. Initially we ignore the power constraint and assume that the transmitted codewords
are Xj = cWj instead of Xj = cWj1{
∥∥cWj∥∥22 < nP}. Furthermore, we assume that Wj are drawn without replacement from
Ms. The contributions from these assumptions will be taken into account later. We consider each of the four bounds in the
theorem separately.
A. Alarm decoding error
We start with the bound in (13), i.e. the probability of not decoding an alarm message in the alarm event, denoted by
P [Ea|A]. From symmetry we assume that devices 1, . . . ,Ka are transmitting alarm message 1 = W1 = W2 = · · · = WKa . We
want to bound P
[
Ŵ 6= 1
]
. Define the interference as S =
∑K
m=Ka+1
Xm, where we note the dependency on Ka. We then
have Y = KaX1 + S +Z. Let W ′ be a random index in Ma \ 1 and let 0 ≤ K ′a ≤ K be some integer. Then by definition
of the decoder (68) an error occurs if
‖K ′acW ′ − (KaX1 + S +Z)‖22 < ‖KaX1 − (KaX1 + S +Z)‖22, (70)
i.e. if the distance, in L2-norm, from a multiple of a wrong codeword cW ′ to the received signal Y is smaller than from the
Ka true alarm transmissions X1. We therefore define the error event
Fa(W
′,K ′a) = {‖KaX1 −K ′acW ′ + S +Z‖22 < ‖S +Z‖22} (71)
We want to bound the probability of this event for all possible combinations of W ′ and K ′a, thus we define the collection of
events
Fa(K
′
a) =
⋃
W ′∈Ma\1
Fa(W
′,K ′a) (72)
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and
Fa =
⋃
0≤K′a≤K
Fa(K
′
a). (73)
Clearly, P [Fa] = P
[
Ŵ 6= 1
]
= P [Ea|A] since the decoder is designed to only output one alarm message, thereby eliminating
the possibility of collision of alarm messages at the decoder.
We first use the fact that S is a sum of Gaussian random vectors and hence is also Gaussian, and obtain the bound
P [Fa(W ′,K ′a)|X1,Ka,S,Z] ≤ eλa‖S+Z‖
2
2EcW ′
[
e−λa‖KaX1−K
′
acW ′+S+Z‖22
]
(74)
= eλa‖S+Z‖
2
2
e
−λa‖KaX1+S+Z‖
2
2
1+2K′2a P ′λa
(1 + 2K ′2a P ′λa)n/2
(75)
= eλa‖S+Z‖
2
2e
−λa‖KaX1+S+Z‖
2
2
1+2K′2a P ′λa e−
n
2 ln(1+2K
′2
a P
′λa) (76)
= eλa‖S+Z‖
2
2−βa‖KaX1+S+Z‖22−nφ(K′2a ,λa), (77)
where λa ∈ R+, φ(k, α) = 12 ln(1 + 2kP ′α) and βa = Φ(K ′2a , λa) where Φ(k, α) , α1+2kP ′α . The bound in (74) follows from
the Chernoff bound [15] and (75) uses the identity [1]
E
[
e−γ‖
√
αQ+u‖22
]
=
e−
γ‖u‖22
1+2αγ
(1 + 2αγ)n/2
, (78)
where u ∈ Rn, α ∈ R+, γ ≥ − 12α and Q ∼ N (0, In).
Next we use Gallager’s ρ-trick [14] to bound P [Fa(K ′a)]. For events A1, A2, . . . and ρ ∈ [0, 1] we have P [∪jAj ] ≤(∑
j P [Aj ]
)ρ
. We get
P [Fa(K ′a)|X1,Ka,S,Z] ≤ (Ma − 1)ρ eρλa‖S+Z‖
2
2−ρβa‖KaX1+S+Z‖22−ρnφ(K′2a ,λa). (79)
Taking expectation over X1 and using (78) yields
P [Fa(K ′a)|Ka,S,Z] ≤ (Ma − 1)ρeρλa‖S+Z‖
2
2EX1
[
e−ρβa‖KaX1+S+Z‖
2
2
]
e−ρnφ(K
′2
a ,λa) (80)
= (Ma − 1)ρeρλa‖S+Z‖22 e
− ρβa‖S+Z‖
2
2
1+2K2aP
′ρβa
(1 + 2K2aP
′ρβa)n/2
e−ρnφ(K
′2
a ,λa) (81)
= (Ma − 1)ρe−γa‖S+Z‖22−nτ , (82)
where τ = ρφ(K ′2a , λa) + φ(K
2
a , ρβa) and γa = Φ(K
2
a , ρβa) − ρλa. Now in the same manner as in (80)-(82) expectation is
taken over S and Z where (78) is used for both. We get
P [Fa(K ′a)|Ka] ≤ eρ ln(Ma−1)−nξa , (83)
where ξa = τ+φ(K−Ka, γa)+φ(1/P ′, ψa) and ψa = Φ(K−Ka, γa). Introducing Ea = max0≤ρ≤1,0<λa − ρn ln(Ma−1)+ξa
and applying the union bound gives
P [Fa|Ka] = min
 K∑
K′a=0
e−nEa , 1
 (84)
, a(K,Ka). (85)
Finally, we take the expectation over Ka. The distribution of Ka is a binomial distribution given by
pKa(k) =
(
K
k
)
pkd ((1− pd) ps)K−k
(pd + (1− pd)ps)K , (86)
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where the normalization coefficient arises because of the certainty that K devices were active. It follows that
P [Fa] ≤
K∑
Ka=0
pKa(Ka)a(K,Ka). (87)
We now consider the impact of the power constraint. Since the standard messages are treated as interference in this bound,
we ignore the power constraint for the standard messages as the bound is still valid. For the alarm messages only one is active
at a given time, so we add the following term to the error probability:
P
[‖cj‖22 > nP ] = P
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
Z2i >
P
P ′
]
(88)
, p0, (89)
where Z = [Z1, . . . , Zn]T ∼ N (0, In). This gives the bound in (13).
B. False positive alarms
We now turn to the bound in (16), i.e. the bound for the probability of false positive alarms, P [Efp|¬A]. In this case the
true Ka = 0, and a false positive occurs if the decoder outputs K̂a > 0. Let W ′ ∈Ma and 0 < K ′a ≤ K. We define the error
event
Ffp(W
′,K ′a) = {‖S −K ′acW ′ +Z‖22 < ‖S +Z‖22}. (90)
The only difference between the error event Ffp(W ′,K ′a) and Fa(W
′,K ′a) is the absence of the true alarm messages. Therefore
we define
Ffp(K
′
a) =
⋃
W ′∈Ma
Ffp(W
′,K ′a) (91)
and
Ffp =
⋃
0<K′a≤K
Ffp(K
′
a). (92)
We have that P [Ffp] = P [Efp|¬A]. As in Section B-A we use the Chernoff bound and the identity (78), and take the expectation
over cW ′ to get the bound
P [Ffp(W ′,K ′a)|S,Z] ≤ eλfp‖S+Z‖
2
2e
−λfp‖S+Z‖22
1+2K′2a P ′λfp
−nφ(K′2a ,λfp) (93)
= e−βfp‖S+Z‖
2
2−nφ(K′2a ,λfp), (94)
where λfp ∈ R+ and βfp = Φ(K ′2a , λfp)− λfp. Using Gallager’s ρ-trick we obtain
P [Ffp(K ′a)|S,Z] ≤ eρ ln(Ma)−ρβfp‖S+Z‖
2
2−ρnφ(K′2a ,λfp). (95)
Taking the expectation over S and Z, and applying the union bound over K ′a, we get the bound
P [Ffp] ≤ min
 K∑
K′a=1
e−nEfp , 1
 (96)
,b(K), (97)
where Efp = max0≤ρ≤t,0<λfp − ρn lnMa + ξfp for ξfp = ρφ(K ′2a , λfp) + φ(K, ρβfp) + φ(1/P ′, γfp) and γfp = Φ(K, ρβfp).
Similar to the previous case, constraining the transmission power results in less interference and hence lower error probability.
Therefore, the bound given by (97) is still an upper bound on the error probability in the power constrained case, and no
additional term is needed.
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C. Standard message error with no alarm
We now consider the bound in (14), i.e. the bound for the per-device probability of error for standard messages when no
alarm has occurred, 1K
∑K
j=1 P [Ej |¬A]. Since the standard message decoder relies on canceling the interference caused by
the alarm messages, we assume that correct decoding of standard messages can only occur if the decoder does not output a
false positive alarm. If there is no false positive, the scenario coincides with the one derived in [1] given by c(K) in (27).
Since the probability of a false positive alarm is bounded by b(K), the probability of error is bounded as
1
K
K∑
j=1
P [Ej |¬A] ≤ 1− (1− b(K))(1− c(K)) (98)
= b(K) + c(K)− b(K)c(K)) (99)
The bound above ignores the impact of power constraint for the interfering standard messages. However, as in the previous
section, the bound is still valid in the case of a false positive alarm. When no false positive alarm is decoded, the power
constraint and collision error of standard messages are accounted for in c(K) through the last two terms in (27) as derived
in [1].
D. Standard message error with alarm
Finally, we turn to the bound in (15), i.e. the average per-device probability of error for the standard messages in the
alarm event, EKa
[
1
K−Ka
∑K−Ka
j=1 P [Ej |A]
]
. As in Section B-C, we assume that there is automatically an error if the alarm
is incorrectly decoded. Assume that the first Ka devices are transmitting the alarm message 1 = W1 = · · · = WKa . The
probability of error for standard messages is bounded by the probability that the alarm is incorrectly decoded or the standard
messages are incorrectly decoded after correctly canceling the interference from alarm messages. Since the probability for the
latter event is bounded by c(K −Ka) we obtain
1
K −Ka
K−Ka∑
j=1
P [Ej |A] ≤ 1− P
[
Ŵ = 1, K̂a = Ka
]
(1− c(K −Ka)) (100)
= 1− P
[
K̂a = Ka|Ŵ = 1
]
P
[
Ŵ = 1
]
(1− c(K −Ka)) (101)
≤ 1− P
[
K̂a = Ka|Ŵ = 1
]
(1− a(K,Ka))(1− c(K −Ka)), (102)
where a(K,Ka) is given by (85).
To derive a bound on P
[
K̂a = Ka|Ŵ = 1
]
we consider the complementary event P
[
K̂a 6= Ka|Ŵ = 1
]
. Let 0 ≤ K ′a ≤ K
and K ′a 6= Ka, and define error event
Fsa(K
′
a) = {‖(Ka −K ′a)X1 + S +Z‖22 < ‖S +Z‖22}. (103)
This event is similar to the error event Fa(W ′,K ′a) with the exception that here the alarm message is known. We define
Fsa =
⋃
0≤K′a≤K
K′a 6=Ka
Fsa(K
′
a), (104)
and, as in Section B-A, use the Chernoff bound and the identity (78) with the expectation over X1 to get the bound
P [Fsa(K ′a)|S,Z,Ka] ≤ eλsa‖S+Z‖
2
2e
−λsa‖S+Z‖22
1+2(Ka−K′a)2P ′λsa − e−n2 ln(1+2(Ka−K′a)2P ′λsa (105)
= −e−βsa‖S+Z‖22−nφ((Ka−K′a)2,λsa), (106)
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where βsa = Φ
(
(Ka −K ′a)2, λsa
)− λsa. Taking the expectation over S and Z using (78) we have
P [Fsa(K ′a)|Ka] ≤ e−nEsa , (107)
where Esa = max0<λsa φ
(
(Ka −K ′a)2, λsa
)
+ φ(K −Ka, βsa) + φ(1/P ′, γsa) and γsa = Φ(K −Ka, βsa). Finally, the union
bound over K ′a is used to get
P [Fsa|Ka] ≤ min

K∑
K′a=0
K′a 6=Ka
e−nEsa , 1
 (108)
, e(K,Ka). (109)
It follows that P
[
K̂a = Ka|Ŵ = 1
]
≥ 1 − e(K,Ka). Substituting this into (102) and taking expectation over Ka as in
Section B-A gives
EKa
 1
K −Ka
K−Ka∑
j=1
P [Ej |A]
 ≤ K∑
Ka=0
pKa (Ka) (1− (1− a(K,Ka))(1− e(K,Ka)) (1− c (K −Ka))) . (110)
The bound above already includes collisions and the power constraint in the decoding of standard messages through
c (K −Ka). However, we still need to include the power constraint of the alarm messages. As in Section B-A, this is done by
adding p0 to each of the two error event bounds e(K,Ka) and a(K,Ka). By defining d(K,Ka) , (1− (a(K,Ka) + p0))(1−
(e(K,Ka) + p0)) the final bound becomes
EKa
 1
K −Ka
K−Ka∑
j=1
P [Ej |A]
 ≤ K∑
Ka=0
pKa (Ka) (1− d (K,Ka) (1− c (K −Ka))) . (111)
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